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Abstract
The Deepfake phenomenon has become very popular
nowadays thanks to the possibility to create incredibly real-
istic images using deep learning tools, based mainly on ad-
hoc Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN). In this work
we focus on the analysis of Deepfakes of human faces with
the objective of creating a new detection method able to de-
tect a forensics trace hidden in images: a sort of finger-
print left in the image generation process. The proposed
technique, by means of an Expectation Maximization (EM)
algorithm, extracts a set of local features specifically ad-
dressed to model the underlying convolutional generative
process. Ad-hoc validation has been employed through
experimental tests with naive classifiers on five different
architectures (GDWCT, STARGAN, ATTGAN, STYLEGAN,
STYLEGAN2) against the CELEBA dataset as ground-truth
for non-fakes. Results demonstrated the effectiveness of the
technique in distinguishing the different architectures and
the corresponding generation process.
1. Introduction
One of the phenomena that is rapidly growing is the well-
known Deepfake: the possibility to automatically generate
and/or alter/swap a person’s face in images and videos us-
ing algorithms based on Deep Learning technology. It is
possible to generate excellent results by creating new mul-
timedia contents that cannot be easily recognized as real or
fake by human eye. Then, the term Deepfake refers to all
those multimedia contents synthetically altered or created
by means of machine learning generative models.
Various examples of Deepfake, involving celebrities, are
easily discoverable on the web: the insertion of Nicholas
Cage 1 in movies where he did not act like “Fight Club”
and “The Matrix” or the impressive video in which Jim
Carrey 2 plays Shining in place of Jack Nicholson. Other
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yQxsIWO2ic
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dx59bskG8dc
more worrying examples are the video of ex US Presi-
dent Barack Obama (Figure 1(a)), created by Buzzfeed 3
in collaboration with Monkeypaw Studios, or the video in
which Mark Zuckerberg 4 (Figure 1(b)) claims a series of
statements about his platform ability to steal users’ data.
Even in Italy, in September 2019, the satirical TV program
“Striscia La Notizia” 5 showed a video of the ex-premier
Matteo Renzi talking about his colleagues in a “not so re-
spectful” way (Figure 1 (c)). Indeed, Deepfakes may have
serious repercussions on the authenticity of the news spread
by the mass-media while representing a new threat for pol-
itics, companies and individual privacy. In this dangerous
scenario, tools are needed to unmask the Deepfakes or just
detect them.
Several big companies have decided to take action
against this phenomenon: Google has created a database
of fake videos [36] to support researchers who are devel-
oping new techniques to detect them, while Facebook and
Microsoft have launched the Deepfake Detection Challenge
initiative 6.
In this paper a new Deepfake detection method will be
introduced focused on images representing human faces.
At first an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [29],
extracts a set of local features specifically addressed to
model the convolutional traces that could be found in im-
ages. Then, naive classifiers were trained to discriminate
between authentic images and images generated by the five
most realistic architectures as today (GDWCT, STARGAN,
ATTGAN, STYLEGAN, STYLEGAN2). Experimental re-
sults demonstrated that the information modelled by EM is
related to the specific architecture that generated the im-
age thus giving the overall detection solution explainability,
being also of great value for forensic investigations (e.g.,
camera model identification techniques of image forensics).
Moreover, a multitude of experiments will be presented not
only to demonstrated the effectiveness of the technique but
3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0
4https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbedWhzx1rs
5https://www.striscialanotizia.mediaset.it/Matteo-Renzi
6https://deepfakedetectionchallenge.ai/
Figure 1. Examples of Deepfake: (a) Obama (Buzzfeed in collaboration with Monkeypaw Studios); (b) Mark Zuckerberg (Bill Posters and
Daniel Howe in partnership with advertising company Canny); (c) Matteo Renzi (the italian TV program “Striscia la Notizia”).
Figure 2. Simplified description of a GAN learning framework.
also to demonstrate to be un-comparable with state-of-the-
art: tests were carried out on an almost-in-the-wild dataset
with images generated by five different techniques with dif-
ferent image sizes. As today, all proposed technique work
with specific image sizes and against at most one GAN tech-
nique.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents some Deepfake generation and detection
methods. The proposed detection technique is explained in
Section 3 as regards the feature extraction phase while the
classification phase and experimental results are reported in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with in-
sights for future works.
2. Related Works
Deepfakes are generally created by techniques based on
GenerativeAdversarial Networks (GANs) firstly introduced
by Goodfellow et al. [14]. Authors proposed a new frame-
work for estimating generative models via an adversarial
mode in which two models simultaneously train: a gen-
erative model G, that captures the data distribution, and
a discriminative model D, able to estimate the probabil-
ity that a sample comes from the training data rather than
from G. The training procedure for G is to maximize the
probability of D making a mistake thus resulting to a min-
max two-player game. Mathematically, the generator ac-
cepts a random input z with density pz and returns an output
x = G(z,Θg) according to a certain probability distribution
pg (Θg represent the parameters of the generative model).
The discriminator, D(x,Θd) computes the probability that
x comes from the distribution of training data pdata (Θd
represents the parameters of the discriminative model). The
overall objective is to obtain a generator, after the training
phase, which is a good estimator of pdata. When this hap-
pens, the discriminator is “deceived” and will no longer be
able to distinguish the samples from pdata and pg; there-
fore pg will follow the targeted probability distribution, i.e.
pdata. Figure 2 shows a simplified description of a GAN
framework. In the case of Deepfakes, G can be thought
as a team of counterfeiters trying to produce fake currency,
while D stands to the police, trying to detect the malicious
activity. G and D can be implemented as any kind of gen-
erative model, in particular when deep neural networks are
employed results become extremely accurate. Through re-
cent years, many GAN architectures were proposed for dif-
ferent applications e.g., image to image translation [45], im-
age super resolution [24], image completion [17], and text-
to-image generation [35].
2.1. Deepfake Generation Techniques
An overview onMedia forensics with particular focus on
Deepfakes has been recently proposed in [41].
STARGAN is a method capable of performing image-
to-image translations on multiple domains using a single
model. Proposed by Choi et al. [6] was trained on two dif-
ferent types of face datasets: CELEBA [27] containing 40
labels related to facial attributes such as hair color, gender
and age, and RaFD dataset [22] containing 8 labels corre-
sponding to different types of facial expressions (“happy”,
“sad”, etc.). Given a random label as input, such as hair
color, facial expression, etc., STARGAN is able to per-
form an image-to-image translation operation. Results have
been compared with other existing methods [26, 30, 45] and
showed how STARGAN manages to generate images of su-
perior visual quality.
Style Generative Adversarial Network, namely STYLE-
GAN [19], changed the generator model of STARGAN by
means of mapping points in latent space to an intermediate
latent space which controls the style output at each point of
the generation process. Moreover the introduction of noise
as a source of variation in those mentioned points demon-
strates to achieve better results. Thus, STYLEGAN is capa-
ble not only of generating impressively photorealistic and
high-quality photos of faces, but also offers control param-
eters in terms of the overall style the generated image at
different levels of detail. While being able to create real-
istic pseudo-portraits, small details might reveal the fake-
ness of generated images. To correct those imperfections
in STYLEGAN, Karras et al. made some improvements to
the generator (including re-designed normalization, multi-
resolution, and regularization methods) proposing STYLE-
GAN2 [20].
Instead of imposing constraints on latent representation,
He et al. [15], proposed a new technique called ATTGAN
in which an attribute classification constraint is applied to
the generated image, in order to guarantee only the correct
modifications of the desired attributes. The authors used
CELEBA [27] and LFW [16] datasets, and performed var-
ious tests comparing ATTGAN with VAE/GAN [23], Ic-
GAN [30] and STARGAN [6], Fader Networks [21], Shen
et al. [37] and CycleGAN [45]. Achieved results showed
that ATTGAN exceeds the state of the art on the realistic
modification of facial attributes.
The latter style transfer approach worth to be mentioned
is the work of Cho et al. [5], where they propose a group-
wise deep whitening-and coloring method (GDWCT) for
a better styling capacity. They used CELEBA [27], Art-
works [45], cat2dog [25], Ink pen and watercolor classes
from Behance Artistic Media (BAM) [43], and Yosemite
datasets [45] as dataset. GDWCT has been compared with
various cutting-edge methods in image translation and style
transfer improving not only computational efficiency but
also quality of generated images.
In this paper, the five most famous and effective archi-
tectures in state-of-the-art for face Deepfakes were taken
into account: STARGAN [6], STYLEGAN [19], STYLE-
GAN2 [20], ATTGAN [15] and GDWCT [5]. As described
above, they are different in goals and structure. Table 1 re-
sumes the differences of the techniques in terms of image
size, dataset and type of input, goal and architecture struc-
ture.
2.2. Deepfake detection methods
Being able to understand if an image is the result of a
generativeNeural Network process turns out to be a compli-
cated problem, even for human eyes. However, the problem
of authenticating an image (or specifically a digital image)
is not new [2, 31, 38]. Many works try to reconstruct the
history of an image[13]; others try to identify the anoma-
lies, such as the study on the analysis of interpolation effects
through CFA (Color Filtering Array) [32], analyzing com-
pression parameters [3, 11, 12], etc. Given the peculiarity
of Deepfakes, state-of-the-art image analysis methods tend
to fail and more refined ones are needed.
Thanks to a new discriminator that uses “contrastive
loss” it is possible to find the typical characteristics of
the synthesized images generated by different GANs and
therefore detect such fake images by means of a classi-
fier. Rossler et al. [36] proposed an automated bench-
mark for fake detection, based mainly on four manip-
ulation methods: two computer graphics-based methods
(Face2Face [40], FaceSwap 7) and 2 learning-based ap-
proaches (DeepFakes 8, NeuralTextures [39]). They ad-
dressed the problem of fake detection as a binary classifi-
cation problem for each frame of manipulated videos, con-
sidering different techniques present in the state of the art
[1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 34].
Zhang et al. [44] proposed a method to classify Deep-
fakes considering the spectra of the frequency domain as
input. The authors proposed a GAN simulation framework,
called AutoGAN, in order to emulate the process commonly
shared by popular GANmodels. Results obtained by the au-
thors achieved very good performances in terms of binary
classification between authentic and fake images. Also Du-
rall et al. [9] presented a method for Deepfakes detection
based on the analysis in the frequency domain. The authors
combined high-resolution authentic face images from dif-
ferent public datasets (CELEBA-HQ data set [18], Flickr-
Faces-HQ data set [19]) with fakes (100K Faces project 9,
this person does not exist 10), creating a new dataset called
Faces-HQ. By means of naive classifiers they obtained good
results in terms of overall accuracy.
Differently from described approaches, in this paper the
possibility to capture the underlying traces of a possible
Deepfake is investigated by employing a sort of reverse en-
gineering of the last computational layer of a given GAN
architecture. This method will give explainability to the
predictions of Deepfakes being of great value for forensic
investigations: not only it is able to classify an image as
fake but also can predict the most probable technique used
for generation being in this way similar to camera model de-
tection in image forensics analysis [2]. The underlying idea
of the technique is to find the main periodic components
(e.g. transpose computational layer) on generated images.
A similar strategy was proposed some time ago in a sem-
inal paper of Popescu et al. [32] devoted to point out the
presence of digital forgeries in CFA interpolated images.
Another difference from state-of-the-art is the working sce-
nario: the proposed technique demonstrates to achieve good
results in a almost-in-the-wild scenario with images gener-
ated by five different techniques and image sizes.
7https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
8https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap/
9https://generated.photos/
10https://thispersondoesnotexist.com/
Method
Number of
images
generated
Size
Data input
to the network
Goal of the network
Kernel size of the
latest Convolution
Layer
GDWCT [5] 3369 216x216 CELEBA
Improves the styling
capability
4x4
STARGAN [6] 5648 256x256 CELEBA
Image-to-image translations
on multiple domains
using a single model
7x7
ATTGAN [15] 6005 256x256 CELEBA
Transfer of face attributes
with classification constraints
4x4
STYLEGAN [19] 9999 1024x1024
CELEBA-HQ
FFHQ
Transfer semantic content from a
source domain to a target domain
characterized by a different style
3x3
STYLEGAN2 [20] 3000 1024x1024 FFHQ
Transfer semantic content from a
source domain to a target domain
characterized by a different style
3x3
Table 1. Details of Deepfake GAN architectures employed for analysis. For each one is reported: all images generated, the generated image
sizes, the original input used to train the neural network, the goal of the network and the kernel size of last convolutional layer.
3. Extracting Convolutional Traces
The most common and effective technical solutions able
to generate Deepfakes are the Generative Adversarial Net-
works specifically deep ones. For all the techniques de-
scribed before, the generator G is composed of Transpose
Convolution layers [33]. In Neural Networks like CNNs,
Convolution operations apply a filter, namely kernel, to the
input multidimensional array. After each convolution layer
a pooling operation is needed to reduce output dimensional
size w.r.t. input. On the other hand, in generativemodels the
Transpose Convolution Layers are employed. They also ap-
ply kernels to input but they act inversely in order to obtain
an output larger but proportional to the input dimensions.
The starting idea of the proposed approach is that local
correlation of pixels in Deepfakes are dependent exclusively
on the operations performed by all the layers present in the
GAN which generate it; specifically the (latter) transpose
convolution layers. In order to find these trace, unsuper-
vised machine learning techniques were taken into account.
Indeed, different unsupervised learning techniques aim at
creating clusters containing instances of the input dataset
with high similarity between instances of the same cluster
while having high dissimilarity between instances belong-
ing to different clusters. These clusters can represent the
“hidden” structure of the dataset analyzed. Therefore, the
clustering technique must estimate which are the parame-
ters of the distributions that most likely generated the train-
ing samples. Based on this principle, an Expectation Max-
imization (EM) algorithm [29] was employed in order to
define a conceptual mathematical model able to capture the
pixel correlation of the images (e.g. spatially). The result
of EM is a feature vector representing the structure of the
Transpose Convolution Layers employed during the gener-
ation of the image, encoding in some sense is such images
if a Deepfake or not.
The initial goal is to extract a description, from input
image I , able to numerically represent the local correlations
between each pixel in a neighbourhood. This can be done
by means of convolution with a kernel k of N ×N size:
I[x, y] =
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,t ∗ I[x+ s, y + t] (1)
In Equation 1, the value of the pixel I[x, y] is computed
considering a neighborhood of sizeN×N of the input data.
It is clear that the new estimated information I[x, y] mainly
depends on the kernel used in the convolution operation,
which establishes a mathematical relationship between the
pixels. For this reason, our goal is to define a vector k of size
N ×N able to capture this hidden and implicit relationship
which characterize of forensic trace we want to exploit.
Let’s assume that the element I[x, y] belongs to one of
the following models:
• M1: when the element I[x, y] satisfies Equation 1;
• M2: otherwise.
The EM algorithm is employed with its two different
steps:
1. Expectation step: computes the (density of) probabil-
ity that each element belongs to model (M1 orM2);
2. Maximization step: estimates the (weighted) param-
eters based on the probabilities of belonging to in-
stances of (M1 orM2).
Let’s suppose thatM1 andM2 have different probability
distributions withM1 Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and unknown variance andM2 uniform. In the Expectation
step, the Bayes rule that I[x, y] belongs to the modelM1 is
computed as follows:
Pr{I[x, y] ∈M1 | I[x, y]} =
=
Pr{I[x, y] | I[x, y] ∈M1} ∗ Pr{I[x, y] ∈M1}
2∑
i=1
Pr{I[x, y] | I[x, y] ∈Mi} ∗ Pr{I[x, y] ∈Mi}
(2)
where the probability distribution of M1 which repre-
sents the probability of observing a sample I[x, y], knowing
that it was generated by the modelM1 is:
Pr{I[x, y] | I[x, y] ∈M1} = 1
σ
√
2π
e−
(R[x,y])2
2σ2 (3)
where
R[x, y] =
∣∣∣∣I[x, y]−
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,tI[x+ s, y + t]
∣∣∣∣ (4)
.
The variance value σ2, which is still unknown, is then
estimated in the Maximization step. Once defined if I[x, y]
belongs to model M1 (or M2), the values of the vector ~k
are estimated using least squares method, minimizing the
following:
E(~k) =
∑
x,y
w[x, y]
(
I[x, y]−
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,tI[x+ s, y + t]
)2
(5)
where w ≡ Pr{I[x, y] ∈ M1 | I[x, y]} (2). This error
function (5) can be minimized by computing the gradient of
vector ~k. The update of ki,j is carried out by computing the
partial derivative of (5) as follows:
∂E
∂ki,j
= 0 (6)
Hence, the following linear equations system is obtained:
α∑
s,t=−α
ks,t
(∑
x,y
w[x, y]I[x + i, y + j]I[x+ s, y + t]
)
=
=
∑
x,y
w[x, y]I[x+ i, y + j]I[x, y]
(7)
The two steps of the EM algorithm are iteratively re-
peated. A pseudo-code description is provided in Algorithm
Algorithm 1: Expectation-Maximization Algorithm
Data: Image I
Result: ~k
Initialize N //Kernel size
Initialize σ0
Set ~k random of size NxN
Set R,P,W matrices with 0 values of the same size as
I
Set p0 as 1/size of the range of values of I
for n = 1; n < 100 n+ = 1 do
//Expectation Step
for ∀ values in I do
R[x, y] =
∣∣∣∣I[x, y]− α∑
s,t=−α
ks,tI[x+ s, y + t]
∣∣∣∣
P [x, y] = 1
σn
√
2pi
e
−R[x,y]
2σ2n
W [x, y] = P [x,y]
P [x,y]+p0
//Maximization Step
Calculate k
(n+1)
s,t as shown in the formula 7
1:Expectation-Maximization. The algorithm is applied to
each channel of the input image (RGB color space).
The obtained feature vector ~k, has dimensions dependent
to parameter α. Note that the element k0,0 will always be
set equal to 0 (k0,0 = 0). Thus, for example, if a kernel k
with 3× 3 size is employed, the resulting ~k will be a vector
of 24 elements (since the values k0,0 are excluded). This is
obtained by concatenating the features extracted from each
of the three RGB channels.
The computational complexity of the EM algorithm can
be estimated to be linear in d (the number of characteristics
of the input data taken into consideration), n (the number of
objects) and t (the number of iterations).
4. Classification Phase and Results
Six datasets of images were taken into account for train-
ing and testing purposes: one containing only authentic face
images of celebrities (CELEBA), and the others contain-
ing DeepFakes generated by five different GANs (STAR-
GAN, STYLEGAN, STYLEGAN2, GDWCT, ATTGAN).
For STYLEGAN and STYLEGAN2, images were down-
loaded from STYLEGAN 11 and STYLEGAN2 12 respec-
tively; while STARGAN, ATTGAN and GDWCTwere em-
ployed in inference mode to generate their respective image
datasets. An overview of the DeepFake data generated for
each GAN is reported in the Table 1.
The EM algorithm, as described in previous Section, was
employed on the 6 datasets described above, in order to ex-
11https://drive.google.com/StyleGAN
12https://drive.google.com/StyleGAN2
Figure 3. Overall pipeline. (a) Datasets of real (CELEBA) and Deepfake images, (b) For each images in (a) features are extracted by means
of EM algorithm; (c) types of classifiers used (K-NN, SVM, LDA).
tract a feature vector ~k able to describe the convolutional
traces left in images. EM was employed with kernels of
increasing sizes (3, 4, 5 and 7) 13. The obtained feature vec-
tor was employed as input of different naive classifiers (K-
NN, SVM and LDA) with different tasks: (i) discriminat-
ing authentic image from one specific GAN and (ii) dis-
criminating authentic images from Deepfakes. The overall
classification pipeline of the proposed approach is briefly
summarized in Figure 3. Let’s first analyse the discrim-
inative power of the extracted feature vector in order to
distinguish authentic images (CELEBA) from each of the
considered GANs (CELEBA Vs STARGAN, CELEBA Vs
STYLEGAN, CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN2, CELEBA Vs
ATTGAN, CELEBA Vs GDWCT). Figure 4 shows a vis-
ible representation by means of t-SNE [28]: in which it is
possible to notice, how some categories of networks that
create Deepfake can be “linearly” separable from authen-
tic samples. However in most case the separation is utterly
clear.
Classification tests were carried out on the obtained fea-
ture vectors with, as expected from what seen from t-SNE
representation, excellent results. All the classification re-
sults are reported in Table 2. In particular, it is possible to
note that:
• CELEBA Vs ATTGAN the maximum classification
accuracy of 92.67%, was obtained with KNN - K = 3,
and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs GDWCT: the maximum classification
13Typical kernel size used by the latest Transpose Convolution Layers
(which have a fundamental role in the creation of the Deepfake images) of
the different GAN architectures
accuracy of 88.40%, was obtained with KNN - K =
3,5,7, and kernel size of 3x3.
• CELEBA Vs STARGAN: the maximum classifica-
tion accuracy of 93.17%, was obtained with linear
SVM, and kernel size of 7x7.
• CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN: the maximum classifica-
tion accuracy of 99.65%, was obtained with KNN - K
= 3,5,7,9, and kernel size of 4x4.
• CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN2: the maximum classifi-
cation accuracy of 99.81%, was obtained with linear
SVM, and kernel size of 4x4.
The kernel size used by convolution layers in the neu-
ral networks represents one of the elements to identify the
forensic trace that we are looking for. Table 1 shows the
kernel size (and other information) of the neural networks
that we have taken into account for our experiments.
As described above, the structure of the GAN plays a
fundamental role in the Deepfakes detection, in particular
for what regards the generator structure. Considering the
images from STYLEGAN and STYLEGAN2, it is possible
to distinguish them, as the authors of the STYLEGAN2 ar-
chitecture have only updated parts of the generator in order
to remove some imperfections of STYLEGAN. This fur-
ther confirms the hypothesis, since even a slight modifica-
tion of the generator, in particular to the convolution layers,
leaves different traces in the images generated. When trying
to distinguish the images from STYLEGAN with those of
STYLEGAN2, we get a maximum accuracy of the 99.31%
(Table 4).
CELEBA Vs ATTGAN CELEBA Vs GDWCT CELEBA Vs STARGAN CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN CELEBA Vs STYLEGAN2
Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size Kernel Size
3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7 3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7 3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7 3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7 3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7
3-NN 92.67 86.50 84.50 85.33 88.40 73.17 73.00 74.33 90.50 89.00 88.67 85.17 93.00 99.65 98.26 99.55 96.99 99.61 98.75 97.77
5-NN 92.00 86.50 84.83 86.17 88.40 75.67 74.17 76.67 88.83 88.83 88.17 85.00 93.00 99.65 98.26 99.32 97.39 99.61 98.21 97.55
7-NN 91.00 87.67 85.33 85.67 88.40 76.67 71.33 78.67 89.33 89.17 88.00 84.83 93.50 99.65 98.07 99.09 97.39 99.42 98.21 97.55
9-NN 90.83 87.67 84.83 86.50 87.70 76.83 71.17 79.00 89.33 89.17 87.50 84.67 92.83 99.65 98.07 99.32 97.19 99.42 98.39 97.10
11-NN 91.00 86.83 85.33 85.83 88.05 76.67 72.83 77.00 89.17 88.67 86.67 83.50 93.17 99.48 98.07 99.32 96.99 99.42 97.85 97.10
13-NN 91.00 87.17 84.50 85.33 87.87 75.33 73.50 77.17 88.33 89.33 87.50 83.50 93.50 99.48 98.07 99.09 97.39 99.22 97.67 97.10
SVM 90.50 89.67 90.33 87.00 87.35 76.50 79.00 80.50 90.00 88.50 88.83 93.17 92.00 98.96 99.42 98.41 96.99 99.81 99.46 97.77
LDA 89.50 88.50 89.50 87.17 87.52 76.00 79.33 81.67 89.67 87.83 88.83 90.00 92.50 99.31 98.84 99.09 96.79 99.61 99.10 97.77
Table 2. Overall accuracy between CELEBA vs. each one of the considered GANs. Results are presented w.r.t. all the different kernel
sizes (3x3, 4x4, 5x5, 7x7) and with different classifiers: KNN, with k ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13}; Linear SVM, Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA).
CELEBA Vs DeepNetworks
Kernel Size
3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7
3-NN 89.96 84.90 80.76 82.69
5-NN 90.22 86.63 82.48 82.77
7-NN 89.57 87.12 82.48 84.27
9-NN 89.51 86.73 83.31 84.27
11-NN 89.25 87.21 83.69 83.97
13-NN 89.57 87.31 84.20 83.45
SVMLinear 88.02 88.75 86.05 85.85
SVMsigmoid 86.08 72.60 83.38 63.66
SVMrbf 89.77 89.71 86.24 87.43
SVMPoly 82.51 86.06 84.65 86.61
LDA 87.56 88.65 86.11 85.48
Table 3. Overall accuracy between CELEBA with all Deep Neu-
ral Network, with different kernel size (3x3, 4x4, 5x5, 7x7 - ob-
tained through the EM algorithm) and with different classifiers
used: KNN, with k ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13}; SVM (linear, sigmoid,
rbf, polynomial), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA).
STYLEGAN Vs STYLEGAN2
Kernel Size
3x3 4x4 5x5 7x7
3-NN 89.36 83.57 90.51 87.24
5-NN 89.56 86.41 89.87 85.52
7-NN 89.16 85.40 90.93 87.59
9-NN 88.55 83.98 89.87 87.93
11-NN 88.35 83.37 90.30 87.24
13-NN 89.36 82.76 89.66 87.93
SVM 91.77 95.13 99.16 99.31
LDA 91.16 94.52 98.73 98.28
Table 4. Overall accuracy between STYLEGAN and STYLE-
GAN2, with all the different kernel size (3x3, 4x4, 5x5, 7x7 -
obtained through the EM algorithm) and with different employed
classifiers: KNN, with k ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13}; Linear SVM, Lin-
ear Discriminant Analysis (LDA).
Finally, another type of classification was the compar-
ison between CELEBA original images and all the im-
ages generated with all the networks as a binary classifi-
cation problem. In this test, a further analysis of the two-
dimensional t-SNE was carried out. Figure 5) shows that,
in this case, samples cannot be linearly separated. For
this reason, other non-linear classifiers were taken into ac-
count reaching a maximum accuracy of 90.22% (with KNN,
K=5), with kernel employed in the EM of size 3×3. Table 3
shows the obtained results in the binary classification task.
Many additional experiments were carried out to fur-
therly demonstrate the effectiveness of the extracted fea-
ture vector as a descriptor of the hidden convolutional trace.
Specifically results w.r.t. classification tests between dif-
ferent combinations of GANs are described furtherly con-
ferming the robustness of the technique. Also other t-SNE
representations are provided and can be found at the follow-
ing address https://iplab.dmi.unict.it/mfs/DeepFake/.
Finally, it is worth to point out that during the research
activity a deep neural network technique was employed to
detect Deepfakes on the datasets described above. Tests car-
ried out with VGG-1614 on both spatial and frequency do-
main of images achieved a best result of 53% of accuracy in
the binary classification task showing that a deep learning
approach is not able to extract what the proposed approach
was able to. Our results are similar in terms of overall per-
formance by experiments exploited in Wang et al. [42] that
is actually able to reach very high results by simply using
a discriminator trained on one family of GANs and using it
to infer if images are real or generated from other types of
GANs.
5. Conclusions and future works
The final result of our study to counter the Deepfake phe-
nomenon was the creation of a new detection method based
on features extracted through the EM algorithm. The under-
lying fingerprint has been proven to be effective to discrim-
inate between images generated by recent GANs architec-
tures specifically devoted to generate realistic people’s face.
Some more works will be devoted to investigate the role of
the kernel dimensions. Also the possibility to extend such
methodology to video’s analysis and/or evaluate the robust-
ness with respect to standard image editing (e.g. photomet-
ric and compression) and malicious processing (e.g. an-
tiforensics) devoted to mask the underlying forensic traces
14https://github.com/1297rohit/VGG16-In-Keras
Figure 4. Two-dimensional t-SNE representation (CELEBA: red; DeepNetwork: blue) of all kernel sizes for each classification task: (a)
CELEBA ATTGAN; (b) CELEBA STARGAN; (c) CELEBA GDWCT; (d) CELEBA STYLEGAN; (e) CELEBA STYLEGAN2.
Figure 5. Two-dimensional t-SNE representation (CELEBA: red; DeepNetwork: blue) of a binary classification problem (with different
kernel size): CELEBA Vs DeepNetworks.
will be considered. In general one of the key aspect will the
possibility to adapt the method in situations on the “wild”
without any a-priori knowledge of the generation process.
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